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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Joaquin Foy appeals from an order entered by the District 
Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on December 7, 
2010, denying his motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) on 
November 18, 2010, seeking to vacate an order of civil 
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commitment pursuant to which he was confined at that time and 
thus requesting that he be released.  Although the Eastern 
District Court previously had issued temporary orders 
committing Foy, when he filed his motion and the Court denied 
it, Foy’s commitment was pursuant to an order of the District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Eastern District Court lacked jurisdiction over 
Foy’s motion, and we therefore will vacate the order denying the 
motion and remand the case to that Court for it to consider 
transferring the motion to the Western District of Missouri, and 
if it does not so to dismiss the motion. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 We trace this case to September 30, 2003, when the 
government filed a complaint in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania charging Foy with threatening a federal official in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).1  Shortly thereafter, on 
the basis of the same conduct alleged in the criminal complaint, 
the government filed a petition in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking revocation of a sentence of probation that 
a district court in the Southern District of Texas had imposed on 
him.  The Eastern District Court conducted a hearing to 
determine Foy’s mental competency to stand trial on the 
criminal complaint and found that Foy was suffering from a 
mental disease or defect that rendered him incapable of assisting 
                                                 
1 There have been many proceedings relating to this competency 
matter in various district courts in addition to those that we 
describe in this opinion, but we limit our discussion to the ones 
germane to our disposition of this case. 
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in his defense.  It therefore committed him for a period of 120 
days beginning on October 24, 2003, the date of the order, to the 
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(d), which authorizes temporary hospitalization of a 
mentally incompetent defendant for a reasonable period of time, 
not to exceed four months, to determine whether the defendant 
might attain the necessary capacity for criminal proceedings to 
continue and for an additional period of time until either the 
defendant’s mental condition improves or the pending charges 
against him are disposed of according to law.  Following entry 
of that order, the government transferred Foy to the Federal 
Medical Center at Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”).  On 
February 7, 2005, the Eastern District Court found that Foy 
continued to be incompetent so that he could not stand trial, and 
further concluded that there was not a substantial probability 
that he would attain that level of competency in the foreseeable 
future. 
 Having made those determinations, the Eastern District 
Court ordered the warden at FMC Butner to assess Foy’s 
dangerousness and decide whether to institute civil commitment 
proceedings with respect to him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4246(a).  Over the next several months, the Court ordered 
additional assessments of Foy’s dangerousness in light of new 
information and, in a particularly significant order, on 
September 19, 2005, the Court entered an order stating that Foy 
“shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 
reevaluation of his dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4246(a).”  App. at 78.  Subsequently, the Court directed the 
parties to agree on a date for a hearing to address Foy’s 
dangerousness, but, before the Court held this hearing, the 
government moved to dismiss the Eastern District criminal 
complaint against Foy by reason of his mental condition.  The 
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Court granted this motion on December 19, 2005, and dismissed 
the complaint.  More than three years later on January 9, 2009, 
the Eastern District Court terminated Foy’s probation included 
in the sentence imposed in the earlier prosecution in the 
Southern District of Texas. 
 Prior to the Eastern District Court dismissing the criminal 
complaint, the government transferred Foy to the United States 
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, in 
the Western District of Missouri.  On December 16, 2005, the 
Springfield warden certified pursuant to § 4246(a) that Foy was 
suffering from a mental disease or defect so that his release 
would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property 
damage to another and that suitable arrangements for state 
custody were not available.  Accordingly, on December 21, 
2005, two days after the Eastern District Court dismissed the 
criminal complaint against Foy, the government filed a petition 
pursuant to § 4246 in the Western District of Missouri, seeking a 
hearing on Foy’s dangerousness. 
 Foy moved to dismiss the Western District petition, 
arguing that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had lacked 
jurisdiction when it ordered his reevaluation under § 4246(a) 
when he was confined at FMC Butner.  The District Court in the 
Western District of Missouri ruled on the motion in an opinion 
of May 9, 2007, stating: 
 A review of the records and files in this 
case clearly establishes that in its order of 
September 19, 200[5], the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did 
not order defendant committed under the 
provisions of § 4246, but rather ordered that the 
  6 
Bureau of Prisons reassess whether a § 4246 
petition was appropriate.  After that reassessment 
occurred, the instant petition was properly filed in 
this court. 
App. at 119.  The Western District of Missouri subsequently 
held a hearing to ascertain Foy’s dangerousness, if any, and on 
September 12, 2007, ordered Foy committed pursuant to § 
4246(d).  Foy appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed. 
 As required by 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(B), the Springfield 
medical facility thereafter sent to the district court in the 
Western District of Missouri annual reports concerning Foy’s 
mental condition and its recommendations regarding his need 
for continued commitment.  Insofar as reflected in the record 
before us, since 2009 these reports have recommended Foy’s 
conditional release.  However, notwithstanding these 
recommendations, Foy has not been released because he refuses 
to accept possible conditions on his release. 
 Rather than accept a conditional release, Foy has sought 
to be released unconditionally by instituting proceedings in both 
the Western District of Missouri and the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.2  Thus, on August 5, 2010, Foy filed a habeas 
corpus petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking 
his release pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but that Court 
                                                 
2 He also has sought relief in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina and, inasmuch as he had been transferred to the Federal 
Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, in the District of 
Minnesota.  See, e.g., Foy v. U.S. Gov’t, Civ. No. 15-1901, 
2015 WL 2131410 (D. Minn. May 7, 2015). 
  7 
transferred the petition to the Western District of Missouri on 
August 18, 2010.  The Western District of Missouri dismissed 
the petition with prejudice and, on Foy’s appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal.  
Then, on September 4, 2014, counsel filed a motion on Foy’s 
behalf in the Western District of Missouri seeking an order for 
Foy’s discharge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h).  That court 
held a hearing on the motion at which Foy testified and was 
represented by counsel.  The court denied the motion on October 
21, 2014. 
 As the foregoing proceedings in the Western District of 
Missouri unfolded, Foy initiated pro se proceedings in the 
Eastern District Court seeking to secure his release.  First, on 
July 8, 2010, he filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Because Foy did not use the 
standard form then in use for such a motion in that district, the 
Court directed its clerk to furnish Foy with that form, which 
contains information regarding the consequence of filing such a 
motion.  The Eastern District Court eventually dismissed the 
motion because Foy failed to submit the form within the time it 
had afforded him.   
 After he filed the § 2241 habeas corpus petition to which 
we refer above, Foy, on November 18, 2010, filed a pro se 
pleading entitled “Motion to Vacate Judgment of Civil 
Commitment Rule 60(d)(3) Fed. R. Civ. P.” in the Eastern 
District seeking his immediate release.  App. at 4.  The Eastern 
District Court denied the November 18, 2010 motion on 
December 7, 2010, and Foy appealed, bringing the case to us.  A 
panel of this Court appointed counsel for Foy and, by order 
dated March 28, 2011, directed the parties to discuss at least the 
following issues: 
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(1) whether Foy’s ‘Motion to vacate judgment of 
civil commitment pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) Fed. 
R. Civ. P.’ can be considered (a) a Rule 60(b) 
motion, (b) an attempt to seek habeas relief, 
and/or (c) a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4246(e) for discharge from confinement or for a 
hearing; (2) whether, if Foy’s motion includes a 
plea for habeas relief, (a) he proceeds under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or some other 
provision, and (b) whether the avenue under 
which he proceeds is available to him generally, 
see United States v. Budell, 187 F.3d 1137, 1141 
& n.9 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Phelps v. United 
States Fed. Gov’t, 15 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 
1994), and/or in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
542 U.S. 426, 447[, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724] (2004); 
(3) whether, if Foy was seeking habeas relief and 
could not do so in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District 
Court should have transferred his filing in the 
interest of justice, see 28 U.S.C. § 1631; and (4) 
whether the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e) have 
been followed in this case in the District Court. 
App. at 3.  The parties capably addressed these issues in their 
briefs.  We now adjudicate the matter. 
 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the 
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Eastern District Court’s denial of Foy’s request for release from 
civil commitment fully resolved the litigation before it.  See 
Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth, 752 F.3d 316, 
320-21 (3d Cir. 2014); Penn W. Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 371 
F.3d 118, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2004).  Though the Eastern District 
proceedings did not preclude Foy from later moving for 
discharge under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h), that possibility does not 
undermine the finality of the Eastern District Court’s order.  See 
United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Of course, our jurisdiction over this appeal does not 
establish that the Eastern District Court had jurisdiction in the 
first place.  Accordingly, the government has been free to 
contend that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over 
Foy’s motion for release, and it does exactly that.  In 
considering that contention, we exercise plenary review.  See 
Bryan, 752 F.3d at 321 n.1.  Because Foy filed his motion pro 
se, we construe it liberally and consider not only the Rule 60(d) 
label that he attached to it but any other bases that could have 
given the Eastern District Court jurisdiction over the motion.  
See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 647-48 (3d Cir. 
1999).  If, after doing so, we conclude that the Eastern District 
Court lacked jurisdiction, we must direct it to dismiss Foy’s 
motion without addressing the merits of the case or transfer the 
case to the Western District of Missouri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1631.  See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 557 
F.3d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 When a panel of this Court originally reviewed this 
appeal it discerned five possible bases for the Eastern District 
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Court to have had jurisdiction over Foy’s request for release in 
his November 18, 2010 motion, and, as we have explained, it 
directed the parties to address them in their briefs and they have 
done so: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h)3; (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); (3) 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d); (4) 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (5) 28 U.S.C. § 
2241.  We address these bases in turn and conclude that none of 
them afforded the Eastern District Court jurisdiction to 
determine if it should grant Foy’s motion for release from civil 
commitment.  We further conclude that we should remand the 
case to the Eastern District Court to determine whether that 
Court should transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to a 
different court that would have had jurisdiction over Foy’s 
request for release, i.e., the Western District of Missouri. 
  A. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) 
 Foy primarily argues on this appeal that his motion for 
release should be treated as a motion for discharge under 18 
U.S.C. § 4247(h).  Section 4247(h) authorizes a committed 
individual to file a motion for a hearing to determine whether he 
should be discharged from the commitment facility.  However, 
the motion may be filed only “during such person’s 
                                                 
3 The panel’s order to the parties regarding which issues to 
discuss referenced § 4246(e), rather than § 4247(h).  However, 
unlike § 4247(h), § 4246(e) applies only when the director of the 
commitment facility files a certificate attesting that the 
committed individual has recovered to the extent that the 
individual’s release no longer would pose a substantial risk of 
bodily injury or serious property damage to another.  Given that 
Foy concedes that this triggering event did not occur, see 
appellant’s br. at 44 n.13, we consider instead the possibility for 
relief under § 4247(h). 
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commitment” with “the court that ordered the commitment.”  18 
U.S.C. § 4247(h); see Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644, 649 
(8th Cir. 2004) (“Archuleta is in custody by reason of a 
commitment order issued by the District of Utah.  Only that 
court . . . may grant the statutory relief he seeks, either 
conditional or unconditional release.”); United States v. Budell, 
187 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that committed 
individuals “will remain hospitalized until ordered discharged 
by the court that ordered the commitment”).  Accordingly, Foy 
could not bring his § 4247(h) motion in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania because when he filed the motion and, indeed, 
when the Court denied it, he was committed pursuant to the 
September 12, 2007 order of the Western District of Missouri. 
 Foy contends that the Eastern District Court had 
jurisdiction based on its September 19, 2005 order that Foy 
“shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 
reevaluation of his dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4246(a).”  App. at 78.  But as the Western District of Missouri 
noted, when the Eastern District Court entered that order, it “did 
not order [Foy] committed under the provisions of § 4246, but 
rather ordered that the Bureau of Prisons reassess whether a § 
4246 petition was appropriate.”  Id. at 119.  Unlike the Western 
District of Missouri, the Eastern District Court has not issued a 
final order of commitment with respect to Foy pursuant to § 
4246(d).  Moreover, when Foy filed his motion under Rule 
60(d)(3) on November 18, 2010, he no longer was committed 
under the Eastern District Court’s temporary order of 
commitment of September 19, 2005.  In authorizing a committed 
individual to file a motion for discharge “during such person’s 
commitment” with “the court that ordered the commitment,” § 
4247(h) offers an avenue for relief only in the court that ordered 
the commitment under which the petitioner was committed 
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when he filed his petition.  See Archuleta, 365 F.3d at 649.   
 Our foregoing analysis makes clear that the Eastern 
District Court’s earlier, no longer applicable order of temporary 
commitment, did not afford it with jurisdiction to entertain Foy’s 
challenge to his confinement at the time he filed his November 
18, 2010 motion.  Cf. United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 
1325 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that, notwithstanding its decision 
to vacate district court’s commitment order, court of appeals 
lacked jurisdiction to order release of defendant because 
subsequent proceedings had been initiated with respect to him 
under § 4246(a) in district of defendant’s confinement, thereby 
staying his release); United States v. Hardy, 770 F. Supp. 2d 
410, 412-13 (D. Me. 2011) (rejecting argument that court’s 
earlier order of commitment under § 4241(d) provides it with 
continuing jurisdiction to initiate dangerousness evaluation after 
that commitment has ended). 
  B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (d) 
 Foy’s attempt to assert jurisdiction based on Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) or (d) fails for similar reasons.  Rule 60(b) authorizes a 
party to move for relief from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding based on various specified grounds, including, as 
Foy contends is applicable here, because “applying the [the 
judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable” or for “any 
other reason that justifies relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), (6).  
Rule 60(d) is a savings clause, clarifying that Rule 60 does not 
limit a court’s power, among other things, to “entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1); see Jackson v. Danberg, 
656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Rule 60(d) permits a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
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judgment in order to ‘prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.’” 
(quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 
1862, 1868 (1998))).4  Nevertheless, Rule 60 by itself does not 
vest a district court with jurisdiction to consider such a motion 
or independent action.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (“These rules do 
not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the 
venue of actions in those courts.”); Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that district court 
required “an independent statutory basis” to exercise jurisdiction 
over claim framed as Rule 60 motion or independent action). 
 Ordinarily, it would be clear that a district court would 
have jurisdiction over a Rule 60 motion or an independent 
action seeking relief from a judgment because the court will 
have ancillary jurisdiction to consider a challenge to its own 
judgment or order. See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. at 
1867 (citing Pac. R.R. of Mo. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 111 U.S. 
505, 522, 4 S.Ct. 583, 592 (1884)) (“The Government is . . . 
wrong to suggest that an independent action brought in the same 
court as the original lawsuit requires an independent basis for 
jurisdiction.”); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“The power of a court to invoke Rule 60(b) to 
vacate its own earlier judgment is unquestioned.”).  Foy 
attempts to rely on this basis for jurisdiction, pointing to the 
initiation of commitment proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 in 
the Eastern District Court and its September 19, 2005 order 
committing him for a reassessment of his dangerousness.  As 
discussed above, however, the commitment order under which 
                                                 
4 Foy’s pro se motion cited Rule 60(d)(3), which preserves a 
court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court,” 
but his brief frames his motion as attempting to assert an 
independent action as authorized by Rule 60(d)(1). 
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Foy was confined when he filed his November 18, 2010 motion, 
and therefore the order from which he sought relief in asking for 
his immediate release, had been issued in the Western District of 
Missouri, not by the Eastern District Court.   
 We emphasize that the Eastern District Court’s earlier 
order of temporary commitment did not provide it with 
jurisdiction to revisit a distinct order of commitment entered by 
a different court.  See Baker, 807 F.2d at 1325.  Though we 
recognize that there may be circumstances in which a district 
court has jurisdiction over a Rule 60 motion or an independent 
action seeking relief from a judgment entered by another court, 
such as where a party to initial proceedings registers a judgment 
obtained in another court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, see 
Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 251-54, 254 n.12, Foy does not point 
to such an independent ground for jurisdiction here.5 
                                                 
5 Of course, the Eastern District Court would have had 
jurisdiction over a challenge to its September 19, 2005 order of 
temporary commitment, but such jurisdiction would not have 
authorized it to order Foy’s release from his current 
commitment, the identified aim of his pro se motion.  Though 
we do not reach a conclusion on the point as we have no need to 
do so, we recognize that arguably the Eastern District Court 
lacked authority to initiate the preliminary § 4246 commitment 
proceedings because it was not “the court for the district in 
which [Foy was] confined” when the Court entered the order as 
he was confined in FMC Butner at that time.  18 U.S.C. § 
4246(a); see, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 314 
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Baker, 807 F.2d at 1324; United 
States v. Steil, 753 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (D. Minn. 1989).  But 
see United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that district court in Southern District of 
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  C. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241 
 Foy correctly concedes that the other two suggested 
grounds for Eastern District jurisdiction that we set forth in our 
March 28, 2011 order are inapplicable.  He cannot rely on 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, which authorizes a “prisoner in custody under 
sentence” to challenge the sentence, because he currently is not 
serving a sentence.  See Archuleta, 365 F.3d at 648 (stating 
civilly committed individual not eligible for relief under § 
2255); Budell, 187 F.3d at 1141 (same).  Nor can Foy frame his 
request for release as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 as he only could pursue such relief in the district in which 
he was confined, and when he filed the motion leading to the 
order now on appeal he was not confined in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447, 
124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724 (2004) (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas 
petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within 
the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and 
file the petition in the district of confinement.”).  Thus, 
regardless of how we frame Foy’s request for release, the 
Eastern District Court should not have considered it on the 
                                                                                                             
California acted within its authority in temporarily returning 
defendant to North Carolina medical facility for that facility to 
evaluate defendant’s dangerousness and decide whether to issue 
certificate of dangerousness pursuant to § 4246); United States 
v. Wheeler, 744 F. Supp. 633, 635, 639-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  But 
even if we concluded that the Eastern District Court erred in 
initiating such proceedings our conclusion would not invalidate 
the Western District of Missouri’s separate § 4246 proceedings 
and its resulting order of commitment.  See Baker, 807 F.2d at 
1325. 
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merits if it did so. 
  D. Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 
 Our determination that the Eastern District Court did not 
have jurisdiction leaves open the question of whether this case 
should be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the 
Western District of Missouri as that court would have 
jurisdiction to entertain the motion.6  We do not know whether 
the Eastern District Court considered that possibility because the 
Court in its order of December 7, 2010, denying Foy’s motion of 
November 18, 2010, seeking his immediate release did not give 
an explanation denying the motion.  Accordingly, we do not 
know if the Eastern District Court denied the motion because it 
believed that it did not have jurisdiction or because it 
determined that the motion was not meritorious.  In the 
circumstances, we will remand the matter to the Eastern District 
Court to consider whether to transfer the case to the Western 
District of Missouri.7   
                                                 
6 Of course, Foy contends that the Eastern District Court had 
jurisdiction so a transfer was not necessary. 
 
7 Though we ordinarily might not comment on the merits of the 
transfer issue and simply would remand the case to the Eastern 
District Court to consider whether to transfer the case to the 
Western District of Missouri we will comment on the merits in 
view of Judge Krause’s partial dissent.  We point out initially 
that Foy refuses to accept conditions on his release, even though 
he could have been released as early as 2009 if he had been 
willing to do so.  Although Judge Krause indicates that 
conditions on Foy’s release could be enforced even if he does 
not consent to them, Foy’s refusal to agree to such conditions 
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signals that he would not regard himself as bound by them and 
forewarns of trouble to come if he is released.  Moreover, if he 
does not abide by the conditions of release there could be 
serious consequences before steps could be taken to enforce the 
conditions.  In this regard, Foy’s Rule 60 motion sought nothing 
less than his immediate and unconditional release from custody. 
 Given Foy’s sole aim of securing immediate and unconditional 
release and his unwillingness to accept anything less, arguably 
“the interests of justice [would be] best served by terminating 
this litigation because its continuation wastes judicial resources 
while moving [him] no closer to [his] goal.”  LeBlanc v. Holder, 
784 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 Moreover, it seems clear that it would be a futile waste of 
judicial and party resources to transfer the case to the Western 
District of Missouri as within the last year on October 21, 2014, 
that court denied Foy the relief he seeks here.  See Campbell v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 694 F.2d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Moreover, the interest of justice does not require a transfer here 
to protect Foy’s rights because if Foy changes his mind 
regarding his desired relief, a determination that the Eastern 
District Court did not have jurisdiction would not pose an 
obstacle to him if he initiates a new case as § 4247(h) authorizes 
committed individuals to file successive motions for discharge 
and the government has the ongoing duty to seek a conditional 
release or placement for him in a state facility.  The situation 
here therefore differs from a case where a transfer is necessary 
to preserve a litigant’s substantive interests, such as would be 
the situation when a statute of limitations has run so that if the 
litigant is required to institute a new proceeding to seek relief, 
his complaint would be subject to dismissal as untimely.   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order entered on December 7, 2010, denying Foy’s Rule 
60 motion and will remand the case to the Eastern District Court 
for it to consider whether to transfer the case to the Western 
District of Missouri.  If the Eastern District Court does not 
transfer the case it should dismiss the motion for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 Joaquin Foy’s case is nothing short of Kafkaesque and 
cries out to be heard by some court of competent jurisdiction.  
Despite not having stood trial and not having been convicted 
of a crime, Foy has been confined in federal penal institutions 
continuously since 2003.  For the last six of these years, Foy’s 
civil commitment under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 
1984 (“IDRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241-47, has continued 
despite the fact that a panel of experts repeatedly has 
recommended that he be released because he poses no danger 
to others if released under a prescribed regimen of care, and 
despite the fact that the IDRA expressly provides in such 
circumstances that a court “shall . . . order that [the 
individual] be conditionally discharged under a prescribed 
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
treatment.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e)(2)(A).  Foy has also raised 
serious concerns that the Government has not complied with 
the statutory safeguards designed to prevent indefinite federal 
incarceration under the IDRA, including the requirement that 
it exert all reasonable efforts to find a suitable placement for 
Foy in a state facility, such as a group home or similarly less 
restrictive setting.   
 For these reasons, while I agree with the majority that 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
lacked jurisdiction over Foy’s motion to vacate his civil 
commitment and have no doubt that the District Court will 
carefully consider whether the “interest of justice” standard 
requires a transfer to a court that does have jurisdiction, I see 
no reason not to expedite the process by remanding with 
instructions to transfer, as a transfer in this case is so clearly 
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“in the interest of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1631.  On this point, I 
respectfully dissent.1  
                                              
 1 Although the majority remands for the District Court 
to decide the question of transfer in the first instance, it oddly 
proceeds to suggest in dictum that transfer may not be not 
warranted (1) because Foy is not entitled to the unconditional 
release he would prefer, but only to conditional release; (2) 
because, in the majority’s view, transfer would be futile as the 
Western District of Missouri has denied unconditional release 
in the past; and (3) because the hypothetical possibility 
remains that Foy could initiate a new action in Missouri and 
attempt to file a successive motion pro se or through counsel 
if he can obtain one.  Notably, however, the majority does not 
dispute that, as set forth in detail below, under the IDRA, 
Foy’s conditional release on this record appears to have been 
mandatory and thus to have been unlawfully denied, and Foy 
has raised compelling statutory and due process arguments 
here, concerning the Government’s imposition of an extra-
statutory condition of his express agreement to the conditions 
of release, that have never been presented to the Western 
District of Missouri.  For these reasons and those described 
more fully below, the “interest of justice” standard leaves no 
room for debate that the courts of our Circuit should promptly 
transfer this action to the Western District of Missouri so that 
the merits of Foy’s substantial claims can be considered 
without further delay by a court of competent jurisdiction; the 
matter is recognized by the transferee court as warranting 
appointment of counsel; and Foy’s six-plus years of what 
appears to be unauthorized detention are not prolonged 
indefinitely by Foy’s inability to overcome procedural barriers 
to successive filings or his inability to present coherent 
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I. 
 Whenever a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a civil 
action, § 1631 states in mandatory terms that the court “shall, 
if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action” to 
another federal court in which the action could have been 
brought at the time it was filed.  28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis 
added).  This determination may involve undertaking some 
“limited review of the merits” of the underlying claims.  
Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1999).  After 
all, it is not “in the interest of justice” to transfer a claim that 
plainly fails.  See Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 152 
(2d Cir. 2004).  However, it is clear after reviewing the 
relevant statutory scheme and the facts of Foy’s case that his 
claims relate to significant potential statutory and 
constitutional violations and they should be decided by a 
court that is able to hear them.  
 Foy’s incarceration in federal detention centers under 
the IDRA began in 2003, when he was found to be 
incompetent to stand trial for verbally threatening a federal 
official.2  Foy was initially incarcerated under 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                                                                     
arguments in pro se motions about the very serious issues 
presented by this case.  
 
 2 The IDRA is phrased in terms of “treatment in a 
suitable facility,” but this “treatment” period has been 
repeatedly equated to incarceration.  See Henry v. Ciccone, 
440 F.2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1971) (Clark, J., Associate 
Justice, United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation) 
(“Again and again we have recognized that the [federal 
medical center] is a penal institution and that one confined 
there suffers incarceration.”).   
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4241, which allows federal detention centers to hold criminal 
defendants for a recovery period while they are temporarily 
incompetent to stand trial.  The IDRA further provides that 
federal detention may continue under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 at the 
end of this temporary recovery period if the defendant’s 
mental condition has not improved as to permit the 
proceedings to go forward.  18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).  Thus, in 
2005, the District Court ordered that Foy be detained under § 
4246 because he was incompetent to stand trial and there was 
no substantial probability that his competency would be 
restored in the foreseeable future.  Shortly thereafter, it 
granted dismissal of the sole criminal charge, and the criminal 
case against Foy was then closed.  His detention under § 
4246, however, continued.    
 But ongoing detention under § 4246 after the initial 
recovery period has elapsed is a last resort—it is only 
available if a person poses an ongoing danger to others in the 
“rare circumstances where [he] has no permanent residence or 
there are no state authorities willing to accept him for 
commitment.”  S. Rep. 98-225, at 250 (1983), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3432; see also United States v. 
Lapi, 458 F.3d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 2006) (observing that § 
4246 is “drafted narrowly” and applies only in rare 
circumstances).   The IDRA therefore contains two important 
statutory safeguards to prevent indefinite incarceration in a 
federal facility.  First, the ongoing detention must be 
predicated on the person’s dangerousness if released, and, 
second, the Government has a continuing responsibility to 
find suitable arrangements for state custody and care.  18 
U.S.C. § 4246(a), (d)-(e).  Foy alleges that the Government 
has complied with neither because there is little evidence in 
the record that it has taken appropriate steps to effectuate an 
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appropriate conditional release for Foy and it has not satisfied 
its duty even to seek, much less find, a suitable state 
placement for Foy.  
A. 
 Turning to the first of these statutory safeguards, the 
IDRA requires that the Government file annual reports on a 
detainee’s mental condition to justify his ongoing 
commitment, 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(B), and requires that, 
when a detainee is no longer dangerous under a prescribed 
regimen of medical care, the director of the detaining facility 
must initiate a discharge procedure with the district court, 18 
U.S.C. § 4246(e), and the court that ordered the detainee’s 
civil commitment must order his conditional release, 18 
U.S.C. § 4246(e)(2)(A).  Since 2009, the annual reports by 
the Risk Assessment Panel at the U.S. Medical Center for 
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri have repeatedly 
concluded that Foy’s release would not create a substantial 
risk of danger to others or the property of others with the 
appropriate medication and care.3  The Panel therefore has 
recommended in each of the last five reports available in the 
record that Foy be conditionally released to a group home or 
similarly structured entity in the community.   Despite these 
recommendations, the facility holding Foy has not initiated 
proceedings to release him, and Foy remains detained.   
 The Government’s retort—that it lacks sufficient 
assurance Foy will fulfill his conditions of release because he 
wants an unconditional release and is unwilling now to sign a 
                                              
 3 Foy states in his brief, which was not filed under seal, 
that the annual Risk Assessment Review Reports, which were 
filed under seal, reach this conclusion. Appellant’s Br. 12.   
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certification of future compliance—seems reasonable enough 
on first impression.  Under inspection, however, it raises 
serious questions under the IDRA and the Constitution that 
warrant careful scrutiny by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 First, how is predicating Foy’s release on his written 
agreement to the conditions of release permissible given the 
plain language of the IDRA?  The statute states, in mandatory 
terms, that once the facility director has determined that a 
detainee will not pose a threat to society if released on a 
prescribed regimen of medical care, the director “shall 
promptly file a certificate to that effect” with the court that 
ordered civil commitment, 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e) (emphasis 
added), and that, following a hearing to confirm the safety of 
conditional release, “the court shall . . . order that [the 
detainee] be conditionally discharged under a prescribed 
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
treatment.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The 
statute does not provide for and hardly seems to leave room 
for the imposition by a facility of its own requirement that a 
detainee agree in writing to abide by the conditions of release.  
Cf. Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 2015) (striking as 
ultra vires an agency regulation imposing an additional 
requirement on criteria for entitlement to visa issuance on the 
ground that such requirement was inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute). 
 Second, why doesn’t the IDRA itself squarely resolve 
the Government’s purported concerns that it lacks assurance 
of Foy’s future compliance with the conditions of his release 
or that those conditions somehow might be unenforceable 
without Foy’s signature on a document?  An enforceable 
court order would seem dispositive on this point, and the 
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statute here expressly requires not only that the District Court 
“shall . . . order that [the detainee] be conditionally 
discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment,” but also that 
the court “order, as an explicit condition of release, that [the 
detainee] comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.”  18 U.S.C. § 
4246(e)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).   
 Indeed, the position taken by the Government here—
that a signed certification is somehow needed to ensure future 
compliance with the conditions of release—ironically was 
disavowed by the Government and repeatedly rejected by the 
courts in the criminal context, where, until its repeal in 1982, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 4163-64, provided in similar terms for the 
mandatory release on specified conditions of inmates who 
had served their full terms of imprisonment.  In subsequent 
litigation over the enforceability of those conditions against 
inmates who had refused to sign or challenged the validity of 
pre-release certifications of compliance, the courts routinely 
sided with the Government that the absence of a signed form 
was irrelevant and the conditions were enforceable as part of 
the statutorily mandated release.  See Robinson v. 
Willingham, 369 F.2d 688, 689 (10th Cir. 1966) (“Congress 
has fixed the conditions attached to a mandatory release and 
those conditions are not effected by the releasee signing or 
failing to sign a release agreement.”); Hicks v. Reid, 194 F.2d 
327, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (rejecting petitioner’s argument 
that his failure to sign a document setting forth the conditions 
of release relieved him of obligation to comply because the 
statute “not only created the right to release but also imposed 
 8 
 
conditions thereon” such that “[b]oth are mandatory and 
neither can be avoided by dissent”).4   
 In none of these cases did the inmate’s refusal to sign a 
document agreeing to abide by the conditions of release either 
provide a basis to delay the release mandated by the terms of 
the statute or render those conditions of release 
unenforceable.  Nor today, as far as I can ascertain, is it the 
policy of the Bureau of Prisons to refuse to release an inmate 
who has served out his term of imprisonment because the 
inmate is unwilling to sign a written assurance that he will 
abide by the conditions of his supervised release—even if 
there is good reason to be concerned that the inmate will 
violate those conditions upon release.  Thus, it may well be 
that a detainee’s “refusal to agree to such conditions signals 
that he would not regard himself as bound by them and 
forewarns of trouble to come if he is released.”  Maj. Op. 15 
n.7.  But when no such writing is required for the release of a 
                                              
 4 See also McMillan v. Parker, 254 F. Supp. 365, 366 
(M.D. Pa. 1966), aff’d, 378 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1967) (per 
curiam) (“The mere fact that petitioner did not sign the 
certificate of mandatory release will not relieve him of the 
conditions imposed on said release. . . .  His release was 
subject to those conditions regardless of whether the 
certificate was signed or not.”); Donahue v. U.S. Parole 
Comm’n, 603 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 1985) 
(“Plaintiff’s refusal to sign his Certificate of Mandatory 
Release is irrelevant to his being subject to the terms and 
conditions enunciated therein.  Congress has fixed the 
conditions attached to a mandatory release and those 
conditions are not affected by the failure or refusal of the 
releasee to sign the release agreement.”). 
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convicted defendant, a court of competent jurisdiction should 
consider whether it accords with the IDRA and the 
Constitution for that extra-statutory precondition to be 
imposed on civilly committed persons who have not been 
convicted of any crime.   
 Third, conditions of release from imprisonment are 
typically enforced as a consequence that follows from future 
non-compliance with those conditions, and not through 
indefinite detention unless and until an inmate commits in 
writing to abide by those conditions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3) (allowing for revocation of supervised release 
upon a finding that the defendant violated a condition of 
release).  Consistent with this norm, the IDRA by its terms 
contemplates the possibility of future non-compliance with 
conditions of release and specifies a single mechanism to 
enforce those conditions: arrest and revocation of release if 
the facility to which the individual is released reports that the 
individual has failed to comply with the conditions.  18 
U.S.C. § 4246(f).  How then does a facility’s prophylactic 
enforcement—preempting any opportunity for non-
compliance by refusing to certify a qualified detainee for 
conditional release as required under § 4246(e)—comport 
with either the statute or the Constitution?   After all, civilly 
committed persons remain entitled to due process, Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979), and detaining such persons indefinitely 
on the basis of a requirement that is neither authorized by 
statute nor necessary to enforce the conditions of release 
might well be viewed as arbitrary and capricious government 
action, cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). 
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 The Government suggests, and the majority seems to 
find significant, that by insisting on unconditional release, 
Foy appears to have made a deliberate choice of no release 
over conditional release.  Appellee’s Br. 3, 54 n.13; Maj. Op. 
15 n.7.  But the argument proves too much, for while a 
rational actor might well go through the motions of signing a 
form necessary to secure his release from a federal prison, 
whatever his actual intentions, no one argues that Foy is 
making rational choices or is free of mental illness.  Indeed, 
that is the very reason he has been recommended for 
conditional release and the reason that the IDRA speaks in 
mandatory terms that do not turn on the purported “choice” of 
the detainee.  Regardless of whether a civilly committed 
individual irrationally insists on unconditional release or even 
irrationally prefers to remain in a federal prison over a less 
restrictive state facility, once he is determined not to pose a 
danger upon release with appropriate conditions (as six years 
of reports attest in Foy's case), the IDRA mandates that the 
facility director certify, 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e), and the District 
Court, upon confirmatory hearing, order that conditional 
release, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246(e)(2)(A), 4247(h).  In sum, 
arguably irrational choices of a person with mental illness, 
where irrelevant to the statutory qualifications for conditional 
release, cannot justify a facility director’s refusal to certify, 
much less a federal court’s disregard of the statutory mandate 
or its tolerance of deprivations of liberty greater than 
necessary.  See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12; Wolff, 418 
U.S. at 556-57. 
 Fourth, even if it were deemed permissible to 
condition Foy’s release on his pre-release assent to the 
prescribed regimen of medical care, how is the Government’s 
interest in ensuring compliance with this condition (not to 
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mention its presumable interest in reducing by at least one the 
ranks of the prison population) actually served by requiring 
Foy to go through the motions of signing some form saying 
that he promises to self-medicate?  Indeed, even assuming the 
detainee is a rational actor, what meaningful assurance of 
future compliance would any detainee’s signature actually 
provide on the one form on which his release from prison 
depends?  Instead, if the Government is truly interested in 
assuring Foy’s future compliance with the condition of 
continued medication, wouldn’t it make far more sense for it 
to expend de minimus resources identifying a less restrictive 
but controlled state facility to which Foy can be released and 
where his medication will be properly administered—the 
solution also mandated by the IDRA, see infra—than to 
deploy yet more prosecutors in yet another jurisdiction 
litigating, in effect, the legal significance of Foy’s failure to 
affix a virtually meaningless signature to a form document?  
Yet, as next discussed, despite the logic of this approach and 
despite the Government’s statutory obligation to pursue it, 
Foy raises a substantial claim that the Government has 
violated this IDRA requirement as well.  
B. 
 The IDRA also requires that the Government “shall 
continue periodically to exert all reasonable efforts to cause . . 
. a State [where the person is domiciled or was tried] to 
assume such responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and 
treatment.”  18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).  There is only a single 
reference in the record to an effort to have a State assume 
such responsibility for Foy’s treatment: a 2007 letter from the 
Pennsylvania Office of Mental Health & Substance Abuse 
Services denying Foy entry to a Pennsylvania State Hospital 
for inpatient treatment.  The Government acknowledged in 
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2007 that it was obligated by statute to contact the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to request a transfer for Foy, 
but nothing in the record suggests that that effort was 
anything more than perfunctory or that the Government has 
made any effort whatsoever to meet this obligation since then.  
Foy thus alleges, pointing to substantial support in the record, 
that the Government has been violating his statutory rights 
under the IDRA.   
 Moreover, these are not garden-variety statutory 
claims.  Because of the Government’s alleged violations of 
the IDRA, Foy has been subject to an ongoing and indefinite 
incarceration for years on end without a conviction and with 
the availability of less restrictive state facilities allegedly left 
unexplored.  And as noted earlier, the circumstances of Foy’s 
continued civil commitment in federal custody raise 
significant statutory and due process concerns.  See Foucha, 
504 U.S. at 80; Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.  Resolving these 
claims is clearly “in the interest of justice.” 
II. 
 Foy may properly raise these challenges to his 
detention under the IDRA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h), 
which allows Foy’s counsel—given the refusal of the director 
of the facility where Foy was detained to file the required 
certificate of conditional release—to make a motion for a 
hearing to conditionally discharge Foy from his commitment, 
and the Government acknowledges that the District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri, the court that ordered Foy’s 
civil commitment in September 2007, would have jurisdiction 
over these claims under that section if this case is transferred.  
According to the Government, however, a transfer would be 
futile because the district court there “has repeatedly denied 
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exactly the same motion that Foy wants to litigate here.”  
Appellee’s Br. 53.  The record does not support that 
contention.       
 While Foy undoubtedly has filed numerous petitions 
for relief in the Western District of Missouri and elsewhere, 
in proceeding pro se in what the record suggests is all but one 
of those proceedings, Foy has not been able to coherently 
present the claims raised here, so other courts, 
understandably, have not reached the merits of those claims.  
See, e.g., Foy v. U.S. Gov’t, No. 15-1901, 2015 WL 2131410, 
at *2 (D. Minn. May 7, 2015) (“Foy’s petition for habeas 
corpus relief is, to say the least, difficult to follow.  A good 
deal of the petition and accompanying documents consist of 
photocopies of books or magazine articles, none of which 
appears relevant to any possible claims under § 2241.  Much 
of the remainder, assumedly written by Foy himself, is nearly 
incomprehensible.”); Foy v. Jett, No. 14-5063, 2015 WL 
439614, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2015) (“Foy’s petition is 
difficult to decipher.”).  In the District Court in this case, on 
the other hand, Foy had the benefit of a dedicated and diligent 
appointed counsel who painstakingly assembled Foy’s court 
and detention center records from across the country and 
identified potential legal claims under the byzantine 
provisions of the IDRA.  Counsel’s careful research and 
zealous advocacy enabled her to present substantial 
challenges to Foy’s ongoing incarceration for the first time in 
this Court.  Thus, the issues presented here cannot be fairly 
characterized as the same ones that Foy has raised 
unsuccessfully in his pro se filings.   
 In addition, despite the majority’s implication 
otherwise, the issues presented here are not the same as those 
raised in Foy’s single prior counseled proceeding that was 
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initiated in the Western District of Missouri on September 4, 
2014 and dismissed shortly thereafter.  While it is true that 
the district court there “denied Foy the relief he seeks here,” 
Maj. Op. 15 n.7 (emphasis added), it is also the case, as 
reflected in the transcript of that proceeding, that Foy’s 
appointed counsel appears to have accepted the Government’s 
contention that Foy was required to agree to the conditions of 
his release as a prerequisite to conditional release and 
therefore focused his efforts on trying to elicit on the record 
Foy’s agreement or explanation for disagreement, see Supp. 
App. 178-85.  In short, the Western District of Missouri has 
never been presented with the statutory and due process 
arguments raised by Foy’s counsel in the case that gives rise 
to this appeal.   
 Nor is transfer rendered futile by the theoretical 
possibility that Foy could initiate a new proceeding in 
Missouri, with a successive motion seeking release under 
§ 4247(h).  Even assuming Foy were somehow able to 
overcome the procedural and logistical hurdles associated 
with successive filings, he assuredly will not be able to 
present the substantial issues raised by this case if left to 
proceed pro se, and his chances of being appointed counsel or 
having his arguments seriously considered on the merits 
appear vastly diminished in the absence of a transfer.  Indeed, 
the best case scenario, absent a transfer, is that Foy, 
proceeding pro se or somehow securing appointed counsel, 
files a new petition re-raising the claims argued here; those 
arguments are cogently presented to the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri; and that court eventually grants 
Foy’s conditional release—a process that would entail 
months, if not years, of additional delay in his conditional 
release.  Worse, it may never come to pass, and no court will 
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consider the merits of Foy’s significant statutory and 
constitutional claims.   Transfer is simply the most efficient 
and just way of ensuring that an individual, who in our 
Circuit received the benefit of devoted counsel, has the 
opportunity to have his claims expeditiously addressed in the 
appropriate jurisdiction.   
 Finally, there is no merit to the Government’s 
argument that we should decline to order a transfer because 
Foy did not request that relief in this case.  As even the 
majority recognizes, given that Foy has contended that the 
District Court here had jurisdiction, his argument of course 
has been that a transfer was not necessary.  Maj. Op. 15 n.6.  
In any event, the statutory language of § 1631 is compulsory 
and requires that the court “shall, if it is in the interest of 
justice, transfer such action” to a court of competent 
jurisdiction, even if it has not been asked to do so by either 
party.  See Rodriguez-Roman v. I.N.S., 98 F.3d 416, 423 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1996) (“The duty imposed on the court is 
mandatory.  It must determine whether transfer is in the 
interests of justice.”); see also Phillips, 173 F.3d at 610.     
 In sum, I believe that Foy has raised substantial 
questions about fundamental deprivations of liberty and due 
process extending over many years, and I do not see the 
benefit of the added delay inherent in additional briefing on 
the transfer issue in the District Court, much less a possible 
appeal back to this Court.  Rather, the “interest of justice” 
would be best served by a swift transfer to the Western 
District of Missouri for the district court there to determine 
whether Foy’s statutory and constitutional rights have been 
violated, and, if they have, the proper remedy for these 
violations.   
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*  *  * 
 For the above-stated reasons, I would remand this case 
with instructions to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 
thereby ensure that Foy has the opportunity, without further 
delay, to have his case heard by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  
